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For most individuals, the use made of health care in a given year is determined principally by 
unpredictable random incidents.  Of course, some individuals have a predictably higher 
predisposition to illness than others.  However, the general consensus is that only a fraction 
of individual variability in health care costs can be predicted.  The purpose of this paper is to 
explore the implications of this inherent randomness for budget setting for GP purchasers.  
The paper argues that variability in utilization in the NHS is very high; that no formula will 
ever completely capture that variability, even for large populations;  that the problem of 
variability is likely to be very acute for a GP practice; and that health authorities and GP 
budget holders will therefore need to adopt a range of strategies to manage the variability. 






The 1991 NHS reforms introduced a system of GP fundholding, whereby part of the Hospital 
and Community Health Services (HCHS) budget was devolved from Health Authorities to 
those general practices which choose to become fundholders.  Fundholders use their budget 
to purchase health care from a range of providers within the NHS “internal market”. Since its 
inception in 1991, the scope of the standard fundholding scheme has been expanded to 
include most elective procedures as well as prescribing, and experiments are underway to 




Before the advent of fundholding, general practitioners referred patients to hospitals and 
prescribed medicines and other forms of health care without any clear idea of the cost 
implications.  The central purpose of fundholding is to make general practitioners aware of 
all of the cost implications of their clinical decisions.  The hope is that the receipt of a budget 
will enable GPs to make efficient decisions about (a) whether to treat a patient and (b) how to 
treat that patient.  The Conservative government claims it forms a crucial element in the 
move towards a primary care-led NHS.
2   
 
The principle of fundholding has not enjoyed universal political approval, and it is not clear 
whether in its original form the scheme would survive a change of government.  However, 
what is almost certainly the case is that, in one form or another, general practitioners can 
expect to continue to receive budgets within which they are expected to operate.  The 
political uncertainty relates merely to the breadth of services encompassed by the budgets 
and the sanctions available if budgets are exceeded. 
 
Fundholding has not received a great deal of research attention.  Indeed, this neglect mirrors 
the general management literature, in which the impact of budgets on organizational 
performance has been the subject of only a modest research effort.
3,4  The first major study of 
budgets in businesses found "astounding" hostility between budget supervisors and budget 
holders.






and more participation in the budget-setting process on the part of budget holders.
6  
However, Macintosh argues that it is naive to assume that such dialogue will in itself 
improve relations.  Much more important, in his view, is that budget supervisors should 
investigate and act on variations from budgets in an intelligent and flexible manner.
7  In 
general, researchers have unhelpfully tended to report conflicting findings on the role of 
supervisory style on corporate budgetary performance.
8,9  This has given rise to the 
development of a "contingency" approach towards budgetary policy.  However, one clear 
finding is that a very sensitive style is needed when environmental uncertainty is high.
10 
 
In the NHS, definitive evaluation of the consequences of the fundholding scheme remains 
elusive.
11,12  However, the number of general practices included has steadily increased, so 
that in 1996 about half the population is registered with a fundholding general practice. 
Fundholding now accounts for 15% of HCHS expenditure.
13  Furthermore, some Health 
Authorities are now creating “indicative” budgets for non-fundholders, along the lines 
suggested by the National Audit Office, suggesting that the principle of setting budgets for 
general practice purchasing has become securely established within the NHS.
14  Thus, 
whatever the future of the fundholding scheme, it is likely that most, if not all, GP practices 
will eventually receive a budget which indicates their “fair share” of local HCHS resources.   
 
How are those local resources determined?  At present the NHS Executive makes HCHS 
resource allocations to Health Authorities using a weighted capitation formula.
15  This uses 
data on age and various social characteristics to model expected predictable variations in 
utilization around the country. Thus Health Authority purchasers receive a national average 
capitation for each citizen resident within their boundaries, adjusted to account for local 
demography, needs and costs.  The Executive now recommends that Health Authorities in 
turn should use similar methods to set GP fundholding budgets.
16  The arguments for using a 




•  first and foremost it promotes equity: only by giving GPs equal budgets for 
equal need will there be any chance of securing the equity objectives of the 
NHS; 
•  a formula makes the construction of GP budgets systematic and transparent; 
•  an appropriately designed formula can make allocations independent of past 
GP behaviour, and therefore remove incentives for perverse referral 
behaviour; 
•  the use of a generally accepted formula will reduce political pressures; 
•  the consequent reduction in levels of conflict might thereby reduce managerial 
costs. 
 
A formula must use expected levels of utilization as a basis for setting budgets.  However, the 
use of averages implicit in a formula disguises wide variability in actual health care 
utilization between individuals.  In any one year, the incidence of illness and the associated 
costs of health care vary considerably, even within a single risk class (as perhaps defined by 
age and needs).  While many individuals may suffer no episodes of illness of any 
significance, some will experience serious illnesses requiring substantial NHS expenditure.  
Thus giving a national average NHS "budget" for each citizen would clearly be nonsensical.  
Some citizens would make no use of such budgets, while others would require funds vastly in 
excess of their budgets.  It is only when individual capitations are aggregated into 
populations that budgets begin to make some sense. 
 
Newhouse et al present the following model of individual annual health care expenditure: 
 
  Expenditure  =  b.Xi + ui + eit 
 
where b is a universal response to known risk factors, Xi is the vector of risk factors exhibited 
by individual i, ui is a time-invariant component of variance associated with individual i 
which is independent of the risk factors, and eit is a person-specific time-varying component 
of variance.
17  The component b.Xi can be thought of as the part of the total variance in 






additional part of variance which could in principle be predicted if it were possible to 
incorporate all potential risk factors of an individual into a formula. The component eit is the 
random part, which is independent of any patient risk factors, known or unknown. This 
model implicitly subsumes variations due to clinical practice into the random element eit.  
Newhouse et al estimated that this random component is likely to account for at least 85.5% 
of the variance in expenditure on any one individual. 
 
This insight can be adapted therefore to partition variability in health care expenditure into 
four components: 
 
  (1)  an element that is due to individual characteristics - such as age - which are 
captured by whatever formula is used to allocate funds to the GP; 
  (2)  an element that is due to patient characteristics which are not captured by the 
formula, such as - for example - the presence of diabetes; 
  (3)  an element that is due to clinical practice; 
  (4)  an element that is totally random, caused by the unpredictable incidence and 
severity of illness. 
 
Components (1) and (2) can be considered the systematic element of health care utilization, 
in the sense that they could in principle be predicted.  In practice, the chosen formula 
compensates GP practices for the first aspect of this systematic element, but not for the 
second. The quality of any capitation formula should in principle be judged by the extent to 
which it maximizes (1) and minimizes (2).  By contrast, the formula should not seek to 
capture variations in utilization which are purely due to variations in clinical practice (3).  
Instead, it should be based on some "standard" set of practices (for example, the current 
national formula uses national average costs as its basis).  And of course no formula can 
compensate for the random element (4).  The hope is that - as the population to which the 
formula is applied becomes larger - so the "uncompensated" element (2)+(3)+(4) becomes 




This analysis implies there are likely to be large unpredictable deviations from any individual 
capitation formula caused by unsystematic variation in expenditure.  However, if - as in the 
NHS - individual budgets are aggregated into populations, then the variability in average 
spending requirements diminishes.  As the size of the population group increases, so "low" 
spenders are combined with "high" spenders, and the percentage variation in actual per 
capita spending from budget steadily declines.  When the populations are very large, average 
spending requirements can be predicted with some confidence, and percentage variations 
from per capita annual budgets become trivial. 
 
THE YORK ACUTE SECTOR INDEX 
 
Although urged to use some sort of formula for allocating resources to GP fundholders, 
Health Authorities are free to adapt any system which is suitable for local circumstances.  
Nevertheless, many are making use of an amended version of the national acute sector index 
developed by the University of York.
18  The York Index was based on an empirical analysis 
of all acute inpatient episodes in years 1990/91 and 1991/92 which sought to identify health 
and socio-economic factors associated with utilization, after adjusting for variations in health 
care supply.
19,20  The analysis used data from 4,985 small areas in England with average 
populations of about 10,000 to identify the link between health care needs and NHS inpatient 
spending, and resulted in the development of the needs index shown in Table 1. Note the 
model is multiplicative, so that the reported coefficients represent the exponent on each 
variable. The index is now used to distribute the acute element of Hospital and Community 






Variable Coefficient  Std  Error 
Standardized limiting long standing illness (under 75)  0.2528  0.0183 
Standardized mortality ratio (under 75)  0.1619  0.0131 
Proportion of economically active unemployed  0.0287  0.0092 
Proportion of pensionable age living alone  0.0765  0.0130 
Proportion of dependants in single carer households  0.0436  0.0122 
 
      Table 1: The York acute sector index. 
 
In examining the implications of variability for GP budget setting, we use the York analysis 
as the basis of our analysis.  It should be borne in mind that the data refer to all acute 
admissions (including emergencies) and do not include prescribing.  Therefore they do not 
correspond exactly to the current standard fundholding scheme.  Furthermore, the study 
refers to a two year period.  Nevertheless, the principles discussed in the paper are likely to 





The York analysis yielded a satisfactory statistical model which accounts for about 55% of 
the variability in NHS acute inpatient utilization within small areas, after taking account of 
systematic health authority effects and demography.  However, by the same token, about 
45% of the variability remained unexplained.  The above discussion suggests that this should 
not necessarily be construed as a failure on the part of the analysts, who were seeking to 
capture component (1) above.  Some of the unexplained variation may indeed be due to a 
lack of data on certain needs factors - component (2).  To this extent the acute sector formula 




in clinical practice - component (3) - and the "random" element in health care costs - 
component (4) - a phenomenon that cannot be captured in any capitation formula. 
 
The acute sector index provides an unbiased estimate of an area's relative need for acute 
inpatient care.  The focus of attention in this paper is however the aspect of variation that has 
not been captured by the formula.  This comprises the omitted part of systematic variation 
(2), the variability due to clinical practice (3) and the random variation (4).  It is captured by 
the level one residual in the small area multilevel model used as the basis of the acute sector 
index.
21  This residual represents the difference between actual utilization and the utilization 
predicted by the formula. 
 
The index was estimated in logarithmic form, so deviations from the multiplicative model 
must be calculated by exponentiation of the residuals.  We take the logarithmic model first.  
The residuals are assumed to be normally distributed.  Their average (weighted for 
population size) is zero, reflecting the fact that the acute sector index is an unbiased indicator 
of utilization.  In aggregate, therefore, variations from the logarithmic model should cancel 
each other out (assuming there are no behavioural responses amongst purchasers to the 
budgets they are set!).  The weighted variance of residuals in the logarithmic model is 
calculated as 0.0113, standard deviation 0.1062.   
 
Residuals from the multiplicative model - the basis of the resource allocation formula - can 
be calculated by exponentiation.  For example, assuming normality, two standard deviations 
above the mean yields a multiplicative variation from the multiplicative model of 
exp(2x0.1062) = 1.237, or +23.7%.  The percentage deviation from the budget implied by the 
multiplicative acute index can therefore be calculated by taking the exponent of each residual 
and subtracting one.  The weighted average of the absolute values of these deviations is 
approximately 8%, an indication that - amongst the small areas - the unexplained component 
of utilization is substantial.  It should be noted that the average small area population size of 
9,648 is roughly equivalent to the list size of a typical fundholding general practice. 






The interest in this paper is in the extent to which aggregation of small areas leads to a 
diminution in the percentage variability of utilization. In accordance with the above results, 
we assume that the logarithmic residual for each small area is drawn from a normal 
distribution, mean zero, variance 0.0113, standard deviation s = 0.1062.  For a sample of n 
small areas, the deviation from the predicted logarithm of per capita expenditure will be 
distributed normally with mean zero and standard error s/√n.  That is, as the number of small 
areas increases from 1 to n, so the variability in per capita expenditure - as measured by the 
standard error - decreases by a factor of 1/√n.  This result enables us to construct a variety of 
ways of illustrating the variability in budgets for different population sizes.  Those that 
follow are merely illustrative of the sort that can be carried out, and are not intended to be 
exhaustive. 
 
Figure 1 shows the 95% confidence limits for variations in actual annual expenditure from 
the per capita target implied by the acute sector model as population size increases - that is, 
the limits within which actual expenditure will fall in 95% of cases.  These are constructed in 
the logarithmic model by computing ± 1.96s/√n for each value of n, the number of small 
areas aggregated.  (Note that one small area is equivalent to a population of 9,648 in the 
following charts.)  The Figure converts the results into multiplicative form, and shows the 
need for a very large tolerance (of about ± 20%) for a population size of 10,000.  This 
decreases rapidly as population size increases. 
 
An alternative way of examining variability is to explore the probability that actual 
expenditure will be more than (say) ±10% away from target in any one year as population 
size increases.  This is calculated as follows.  First the multiplicative deviations 1.1 and 0.9 
(equivalent to ±10%) are converted to logarithmic form: namely, ln(1.1) = 0.09531 and 
ln(0.9) = -0.10536.  For each n, that part of the probability distribution lying outside those 
limits is then calculated for a normal distribution with mean zero, standard deviation s/√n. 
While the probability of a 10% deviation is 1 in 3 for populations of 10,000, for populations 












becomes 1 in 400, and for a typical Health Authority with a population of 450,000 it is 
microscopic. By way of contrast, the probability of 5% deviation for a Health Authority is 
0.0013, and of a 1% deviation 0.52. 
 
Finally, Figure 2 offers another perspective on the analysis.  For three population sizes 
(10,000, 100,000 and 500,000) the chart shows the probability that the absolute percentage 
deviation from target will exceed certain levels. For each population size P the number of 
small areas np required is calculated as P/9,648.  Then the relevant standard error is s/√np.  
Notice that an annual deviation of more than 4% is very unlikely for the largest population 
group.  However the chart implies that large deviations from target will be the norm amongst 
populations of 10,000.  These empirical findings are consistent with results from simulation 





The above analysis indicates that any budgeting system for GP practices will be subject to 
considerable random variability that cannot be captured by any allocation formula.  Clearly 
such variability may have a number of consequences, most especially in the way that GPs 
respond to any variation in expenditure from their budgets.  In examining these consequences 
it is important to bear in mind that in the first instance neither the GP practice nor the health 
authority is likely to have a clear idea as to whether the recorded variations in expenditure are 
due to variations in clinical practice, variations in contract prices or variations in the 
incidence of illness.  An algebraic formulation of the problem might be as follows: 
 
  Expenditure = Budget x (1 + C) x (1 + P) x (1 + I) 
 
where  C is the variation in clinical practice from the local norm; P is the variation in prices 
from the local norm; I is the unpredicted variation in incidence and severity of illness 




are zero, but the above analysis suggests that within any one practice there may be big 
variations from zero.  These variations have potentially serious consequences for NHS 
purchasing policy, particularly as it relates to GP fundholding.  In particular, they may have 
important consequences relating to the way in which GP budget holders respond to any 
variation in expenditure from their budgets.   
 
Some budget holders will find that their outturn expenditure is considerably lower than their 
budgets.  The underspend could therefore be used in a number of ways: 
 
•  to fund other services and developments for the practice patients; 
•  to refer more patients than they otherwise might have done; 
•  to purchase a higher quality of care than is the norm for NHS procedures; 
•  to contribute to the practice's reserves as a contingency for future overspends; 
•  to contribute to overspends in other budget-holding practices. 
 
Furthermore, low spenders who are fundholders might adopt a relatively relaxed attitude in 
negotiating prices with providers. 
 
In contrast, some budget holders will experience substantial overspends.  Such "high 
spenders" may respond in a number of ways.  On the clinical side they might reduce the 
number of referrals and the quality of care (as expressed, say, in waiting time) offered to 
patients for fundholding procedures.  Fundholders in this position are likely to become 
relatively price sensitive in contract negotiations with providers.  Behaviourally, they may 
react with hostility to the budget setter (the Health Authority).  In the extreme, high spending 
practices may resort to crisis management, giving rise to a wide range of potentially adverse 
consequences.   
 
A most important result of the variations in financial pressures experienced by GPs could be 
that patients with identical conditions will be treated differently depending on the 
circumstances of their GP - that is, the budgeting scheme will give rise to inequities.  Such 







Inequity might arise within a practice because GPs may experience differing pressures 
depending on the time of year.
23,24  For example, at the start of the year a practice might feel 
relatively relaxed about its budget position.  However, as events unfold, the practice might 
perceive that its current pattern of spending is projected to lead to an overspend in the budget. 
One response could be to amend its criteria for referring patients, either by adopting a more 
severe threshold for referral or by referring under a contract with a lower price or lower 
quality of care.  In other words, patients who present later in the year might experience 
different referral practice  
 
In the same way, inequity could arise between practices because of the differences in 
budgetary pressures.  As noted above, such variations might allow different practices to adopt 
different standards of care, in terms of both quantity and quality of treatment.  Identical 
patients could therefore experience different health care depending on the practice they 
belong to. 
 
The high levels of risk inherent in meeting expenditure targets might induce GPs to adopt a 
number of defensive tactics.  For example, fundholders might negotiate block contracts with 
providers.  Such tactics, if adopted on a widespread basis, would undermine many of the 
objectives of budget holding, as they remove the incentive for GPs to adopt innovative 
approaches to health care.  As an alternative defensive devise, practices might establish large 
contingency reserves by reducing the amount and quality of care offered to their patients.  
Moreover, GPs might seek to insulate themselves against overspends by "cream skimming" 
healthier patients.
25  They might even take out insurance with the private sector, resulting in 
an unproductive outflow of funds out of the NHS.   
 
Thus, under a budgeting regime, the unpredictable variability inherent in the demand for 
health care gives rise to a fundamental tension between efficiency and equity.  If budgets 




countervail unpredictable variations in disease incidence.  Clearly variations in referral 
practice compromise the principle of equity - one of the cornerstones of the NHS.  Therefore, 
if Health Authorities do not handle variations from budgets with care and understanding, the 
whole budgeting system could be discredited.  And, unless measures are taken to moderate 
the pressures towards inequitable treatment, the budgeting scheme could give rise to hostility 
and alienation amongst GPs and patients. 
 
What, then, can be done to avoid this potentially damaging situation? Given below are some 
strategies that could be adopted to manage the variability we have described, and to moderate 
the risk faced by general practitioners. 
 
One of the obvious mechanisms for ameliorating the potentially adverse effects noted above 
would be to increase the size of patient groups for which budgets are set.  This principle 
would suggest that a number of practices might be pooled, effectively to become a single 
fundholder.  The members of such a grouping would in effect offer each other a degree of 
insurance against random variability.  An additional benefit of such arrangements may be 
some reduction in managerial costs associated with negotiating and monitoring contracts with 
providers.  These arguments would support the move towards multifunds and locality 
purchasing.
26  However, pooling practices for the purposes of risk sharing requires a degree 
of mutual trust and cooperation.  In choosing the appropriate level of aggregation, therefore, 
there is a need to balance the reduction in risk against coordination costs, and there may be 
an argument for basing the choice of partners on factors such as similarity of patient 
characteristics as well as geographical proximity. 
 
In the same way, the problem of unpredictable variability can be alleviated by setting budgets 
for a period of more than one year.  Under such arrangements, practices can to some extent 
offset underspends in one year against overspends in another.  Longer budget periods would 
enable Health Authorities to become aware of serious budgetary problems at an early stage 
and to take appropriate action without inducing a crisis in the affected practice.  Health 






year in their dealings with fundholders, and a move towards "rolling" budgets of (say) three 
years may be a helpful way of formalizing this longer term view. 
 
To some extent the problem of large unpredictable variability is caused by the random 
incidence of a small number of very expensive procedures.  There is therefore a strong 
argument for excluding certain expensive procedures from the budgeting scheme.  The 
existing standard fundholding scheme acknowledges this difficulty by excluding certain 
procedures and costs in excess of £6,000 incurred by any one patient in any one year, and 
there may be an argument for local discretion in such matters.
27 
 
Similarly, a practice's expenditure might be highly influenced by a small number of highly 
dependent patients.  There is therefore an argument for excluding predictably expensive 
patients from the budgeting scheme.  The Health Authority would cover all or part of the 
costs of procedures required by such patients.  By definition, such patients will suffer from 
some chronic condition which necessitates predictably high health care expenditure.  The 
principal difficulty with such arrangements would be determining criteria for excluding a 
patient, and ensuring that any such criteria did not offer GPs perverse incentives to 
exaggerate the seriousness of a patient's condition.  A beneficial by-product of such 
arrangements is that they would reduce the incentive for GP practices to cream skim healthier 
patients. 
 
Although presented above as a potentially dysfunctional outcome, there might nevertheless 
be some merit in experimenting with contractual form on the part of those GPs who are 
fundholders.  Clearly a move to block contracts - under which all the risk is transferred  to the 
provider - would effectively remove many of the intended incentives underlying fundholding. 
 However, if it is believed that the use of cost per case contracts (which is implicit in our 
analysis) exposes the budget holder to unacceptable risk, then there may be an argument for 




and incremental patients then attract less than full costs.  Such contracts effectively enable 
the risk to be shared between purchaser and provider. 
 
A consequence of the above analysis is that all Health Authorities will need to establish 
contingency reserves to accommodate "overspends".  Such reserves may be treated in a 
number of ways.  For example, the total Health Authority budget might be top-sliced to 
create a type of insurance fund.  Or "underspenders" could be given incentives to return some 
of their unused funds, perhaps by guaranteeing that they will receive a credit for any 
overspends in the future. 
 
Finally, and most importantly, variations from budgets should be explored carefully.  It is 
essential that every effort should be made to establish the extent to which such variations can 
be attributed to differences in disease incidence, variations in contract prices or variations in 
clinical practice.  Some element of peer review may be appropriate, and engaging in a 
dialogue with budget holders will be essential if GPs' confidence in the budgeting system is 




All of the measures described above are likely to have some role to play in easing the 
tensions generated by a GP budgeting regime.  However, if the setting of budgets is to 
continue to influence GP behaviour, no managerial measures in themselves can completely 
eliminate the potentially damaging consequences of unpredictable variability in demand for 
health care.  Instead, all the evidence suggests that Health Authorities will have to adopt a 
very sensitive managerial style in how they react to variations from budgets, and be prepared 
to engage in constructive dialogue with fundholding practices.  In spite of the difficulties 
raised above, the increased devolution of budgets within the NHS is likely to continue, 
regardless of political leadership.  The challenge to both Health Authorities and general 
practitioners is to make the system work. 
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